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ABSTRACT: The dominance of a purist, ‘scientistic’ form of reason since the Enlightenment 
has eclipsed and produced multiple misunderstandings of the nature, role of and importance 
of the millennia-old art of rhetoric. For centuries the multiple perspectives conveyed by 
rhetoric were always the counterbalance to hubristic claims of certainty. As such rhetoric was 
taught as one of the three essential components of the ‘trivium’ – rhetoric, dialectic and 
grammar; i.e. persuasive communication, logical reasoning and the codification of discourse. 
These three disciplines were the legs of the three legged stool on which western civilisation still 
rests despite the perversion and muddling of the first of these three. This essay explains how 
the evisceration of rhetoric both as practice and as critical theory and the consequent over-
reliance on a virtual cult of rationality has impoverished philosophy and has dangerously 
dimmed understandings of the human condition. 
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THE PROBLEM 
There are many criticisms of the rationalist themes and approaches which burgeoned 
during and since the Enlightenment. This paper enlists Max Horkheimer (1895 – 
1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903 – 1969), John Deely (1942 – ) and Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839 –1914), along with some leading Enlightenment figures themselves in 
order to mount a critique of the fate of the millennia-old art of rhetoric during that 
revolution in ways of thinking. The argument will be that post-Enlightenment over-
emphasis on what might variously be called dialectic, logic or reason (narrowly 
understood) has dulled understanding of what people are and how people think. 
There have been two serious consequences of this mistake. Firstly philosophers have 
been circumvented and have lost potency because of their over-reliance on logic as the 
way of guiding human affairs. Secondly charlatans have invaded what was hitherto 
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the quasi-sacred and much more prestigious space of persuasive communication. This 
space was sacred and prestigious when it was under the control of the church and 
other moralists. From the nineteenth century onward paralysis in thinking about the 
crucial role of the rhetorical-dialectical nexus has enabled philistines and the 
mendacious to capture and exploit this poorly understood realm of ideological and 
cultural production. This paper argues that putatively democratic countries now 
operate with a lobotomised intelligence where it comes to understanding and 
confronting the ways persuasive communication controls political and social 
construction. It calls for the aesthetes of science and logical reason to reverse their 
antiquated, modernist, rejection of the realm of rhetoric. If intellectuals do not 
sufficiently grasp the notion of what rhetoric is they will be doomed to increasing 
marginalisation in a contemporary world where rhetoric dominates.       
RHETORIC AND ITS REJECTION 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) has a good summary of what rhetoric is and its importance 
in his: The Advancement of Learning: 
…the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better 
moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof 
by three means--by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by 
imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or 
affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are 
wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation 
within ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and 
importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. 
Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts 
should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it.  For the 
end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; 
the end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade 
it; the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to 
oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but ex oblique, for caution.1   
In other words morality and the ways facts are presented have a major role in shaping 
thought. Thought is not formed by logic alone. 
For Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679):  
Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the Passions of the Judge; but 
chiefly in Proofs. And that this Art is Profitable...It consisteth therefore chiefly in 
1 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, retrieved 25 February, 2013, from website: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5500/pg5500.txt , 2004. 
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Proofs; which are Inferences: and all Inferences being Syllogismes, a Logician, if he 
would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme, and an Enthymeme, 
(which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all 
Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick; whether they infer truth or 
probability: and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil 
men by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a 
good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it 
leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are 
Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long Scientifical proofs, drawn from the 
principles through many Syllogismes; and therefore had need to be instructed by the 
Rhetoricall, and shorter way.2  
A plain syllogism is the attempt to arrive at irrefutable conclusions by the logical 
progression of statements of apparently clear facts. An enthymeme is reasoning where 
one of the statements presumes and relies on prior understandings in the audience 
and thus is vulnerable to charges that it is not irrefutable. What Hobbes is essentially 
saying is that people do not usually base their understanding on lengthy, perfect 
explanation. We may presume that we think rationally. But most of the time we 
operate in terms of the multiple assumptions in the discourses which are the 
foundations of our culture. By discourses here we mean mental constructions which are 
formed and expressed by language and other cultural forms. In practical terms, when 
thinking about something we nearly always have no option but to think in shortcuts. 
We interrogate our largely culturally formed ways of perceiving in order to mentally 
seize onto the most expeditious depiction of what seems to be the case. That is we 
reason as reasoning is commonly understood enthymematically rather than syllogistically. 
On a day to day basis we do not reason as if we were in a scientific or social scientific 
laboratory3. Instead in colloquial terms we reason by making reasonable assumptions. 
Nobody is equipped or has time to always seek ultimate scientific truths about 
everything we encounter every day, about everything we think every day, about 
everything we do every day. 
Hobbes is saying that for this reason it would be a mistake to presume we or 
others privilege what are in fact impractical levels of attaining the ultimate 
unassailable scientific truth. The rhetorical wisdom of his period understood that 
people operate at the enthymematic level. The enthymematic level is that aspect of 
the operation of culture which involves the rhetorical – which involves the ways things 
are ‘put’. This enthymematic/rhetorical aspect of human communication is no 
2 Thomas Hobbes, A Brief of the Art of Rhetoric, retrieved 25 February, 2013 from ‘Classic rhetoric and 
persuasion’ website: http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/hobbes/index.htm , 2013. 
3 See discussion on ideoscopy and cenoscopy below. 
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different today. However scientism has ordained that the bulk of us ordinary folk 
neglect to equip ourselves with a full understanding of, or significant skills in, the 
operation of rhetoric. This field has been vacated to the instrumentally motivated 
specialists in: psychology and social psychology, organisational communication, 
psephology, public relations, public affairs, media advice, opinion editorial 
production, corporate communication, think tanks, advertising, market research, 
opinion research, customer relations, event management and so on. This intellectual 
vacation of the field of rhetoric, this leaving it to the experts, involves a lulling, a 
scientistic lullaby which has left this powerful art in how thinking and thus how 
culture is formed vulnerable to manipulation by the mendacious, the stupid, the 
downright evil. 
Another Enlightenment figure Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780) can also 
be quoted to challenge too exaggerated a reliance on rationalism when the human 
condition in fact requires another dimension to how we make up our minds. 
Condillac stresses the way people’s thought is influenced by their passions and affect in 
addition to cold logic. Condillac writes: 
The influence of the passions is so great that without it the understanding is 
virtually at a standstill, so much so that for lack of passions there is barely any 
intellect left. For certain talents they are even absolutely necessary.4 
 For instance killing an animal for food cannot just be conceived by those who we 
would count as human in a purely logical manner and killing animals for fun even less 
so. Hopefully most of us have sentiments and affections which steer our rationalisation 
about whether or how either sorts of killing should be done. Similarly how refugees or 
disaster-hit people are aided is surely not decided on a so called ‘rational’ basis alone? 
As another example thinking about climate change, including the fate of future 
generations starting with lowland island dwellers can surely not be judged simply on 
purely ‘rational’ grounds? Purely ‘rational’ grounds might include the reasoning for 
instance: Unaided victims might be involved in mass migration and political 
instability; the economic output of their regions will decrease; and so on. But isn’t 
there a different dimension to our thought which irrationally (that is, not by cold logic) 
tells us people just should not be left to die? Reason as the term is commonly used 
might militate that workers have adequate wages and health and safety conditions. 
Better working conditions might increase productivity. But does instrumental reason 
alone stipulate that families should not have loved ones maimed or killed on factory 
machines? Does this sort of logic stipulated that women should or should not get left 
4 Etienne de Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p. 69. 
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behind in career progression? On the more positive side: Do people better themselves 
at work, in terms of education, or in their community generally for purely rational 
reasons to do with tangible reward? Doesn’t affect spur people on? Do not feelings of 
self-worth, pride, curiosity, ambition, or in some instances unfortunately fear or greed 
have a lot to do with this so called rationality? Emotional appeal is represented by 
‘pathos’ in the trilogy: ethos, logos and pathos – character, logic and emotion. Ethos 
logos and pathos are described in Aristotle’s analysis of rhetoric in his still useful 
handbook: The Art of Rhetoric or Rhetoric. In that book Aristotle suggests how to play on 
the above kinds of human sentiments. He shows them as components of an aspect 
which cannot be, or at least which should not be, sundered from reasoning if one is 
going to genuinely understand what it is to reason as humans are generally thought of 
as reasoning. That aspect to do with how humans reason he calls rhetoric. 
Despite the above acknowledgement of the ways the rhetorical dimension shapes 
thinking a tendency to eclipse the usefulness and prestige of rhetoric had already 
begun before the above Enlightenment authorities were born. A major opponent of 
rhetoric was Peter Ramus (1515 – 1572). As Walter Ong (1912 – 2003) explains: 
Dialectic and rhetoric have been intertwined at least from the time of the  Greek 
Sophists till our present day, and when Ramus decrees that they must be 
disengaged from one another…he engages some of the most powerful and 
obscure forces in intellectual history.5   
Ong explains that the Ramist tendency stripped substance from the scholarship and 
the practice of rhetoric. The pre-Ramist rhetorical curriculum which Bacon, Hobbes 
and Condillac would have recognised understood rhetoric to include:  
Inventio: Invention or discovery of innovative expression – that is the manufacture, 
the creation of discourse. This is tantamount to the production of culture and thus the 
facilitation of ways in which it is possible to think. 
Dispositio: Disposition, that is judgement about the arrangement of elements of the 
discourse so that it has the most, or certain types of discursive meaning and effect.  
Elocutio: Style of persuasion e.g. argumentative, emotive, or poetic. 
Pronuntiatio: Oratorical delivery – performance in terms of voice and gesture. Like 
elocutio, pronuntiatio contextualises how the invented and arranged discourse is emitted 
and received. These latter two elements thus contribute to the discourse. They play a 
part in how the mind is invited to think. 
5 Walter Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 270. 
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Memoria: Memory including understanding how memories dim and how they can 
be rekindled as well as mnemonic devices. This element is to do with the art or 
science of how to play on people’s memories. 
Ong 2002 (p. 4) argues that Ramus, distorted the work of Cicero (106-43 BCE) as 
well as Renaissance humanist Rudolph Agricola (1444 - 1485) and others to privilege 
dialectic or logical reasoning over rhetoric. Aristotle (circa 384 - 322 BCE) had 
previously decreed them ‘counterparts’ to the conveyance of understanding: 
Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic…all men engage in them both after a 
fashion. For all men attempt in some measure to conduct investigations and to 
furnish explanations…6  
Ong tells the story about how Ramus moved inventio and dispositio out of the 
procedures of rhetoric into those of dialectic. This meant that judgement of how facts 
were to be put: dispositio now became an abstract logical process rather than an 
admittedly fallible but many-facetted and highly regarded human argumentative 
process. Similarly actual, concrete, uninvented facts had to be found instead of 
discursively created (inventio). Abstract, detached, notionally scientific procedure was 
privileged over the more discursive as the producer of inter and intra human 
depictions of reality. At the same time the essential human characteristic of 
remembering, which is an omnipresent dimension of the ways we think and fail to 
think every day, was forgotten and largely remains forgotten. It was subsumed by 
privileging written and other forms of recording which now largely stand in for 
human memory. The Enlightenment saw the vast expansion of vernacular and 
scholarly scientific writing. This startling revolution in communication technology was 
allowed to overwhelm the importance of the ways humans organically record and 
organically forget. Ong7 remarks on the downgrading of this element of rhetoric 
which involves a failure to acknowledge that the mind does not operate like a 
congealed text. The implication again is that scientific, or as critiques might call them: 
scientistic advances have made redundant or superseded traditional, human discursive 
practices. The downgrading of memoria is perhaps one of the least understood and 
most important aspects of the dismantling of rhetoric. Its removal from the field of 
discussion obscures the point that whatever the external-to-the-mind recording of 
facts, the mind’s comprehension of all facts remains an active organic process of 
decay, rejuvenation, conjugation and evolution on a second-by-second and year-by-
year basis. The disappearance of memoria detracts from and tends to makes two-
dimensional philosophical discussion about those affect and sentiment-related notions: 
6 Aristotle, and Hugh Lawson-Tancred, The Art of Rhetoric, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 66. 
7 Ong, Walter J., Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London ; New York: Routledge, 2002. 
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the will and habit – including habitus. These formerly discursive, pliable, tangible 
human qualities become reified into the solid characteristics of cold hard yet abstract 
facts. Will and habit become frozen artefacts which lose the constantly morphological 
nature previously allowed by a more human understanding of memory’s constant 
forgetting and constant reconceptualisation.   
Ong explains that Ramus and his tradition collapsed rhetoric into elocutio (style) 
and pronuntiatio (performance) only. These are epiphenomena which rely on inventio 
and disposition for their substance. This is the usually dismissed and often despised or 
ridiculed style and performance… the ‘spin’, which is contrasted to the dialectical 
facts of the case. Rhetoric in this sense loses its status as the practice and the field of 
study which enables and critiques the advocacy of the best case for how the facts 
could be perceived. Full consciousness about how facts are conceived and applied is 
set aside. Instead there is a naivety, a mesmerised wonderment about the marvellous 
‘facts’ themselves… facticity per se. 
With the refusal to concede that perceptions of our world are always, and always 
quite rightly delivered via a mixture of persuasion and emotion as well as ‘facts’ we 
become the products of a culture where truth must always be an ideoscopic product. 
That is truth can only be accredited by specially equipped scientific and social 
scientific experts. Cenoscopically arrived at truth, that is ‘facts’ weight up in and 
balanced by discourses involving affect become less believable8. It is this eviscerated, 
impotent version of rhetoric which sits scorned in the back seat while sure factual 
science drives a world which is an antonym of egalitarianism towards its non-
environmental future. We are all passengers of this current one-dimensional version of 
rhetoric. This is a version in which facts are presented superficially with a gloss – a 
‘spin’ which is far removed from responsibility for the logic – the reality of what these 
facts actually portend. Some of the most important authorities for what is being 
claimed about rhetoric in this article include the below9. However glimpses of the 
remains of the pillaging of rhetoric can be seen out of the corner of the eye as it were 
in 19th and 20th century authorities of the post-modern. For instance Nietzsche’s 
Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language; Eagleton’s ‘A small history of rhetoric’; 
Barthe’s ‘The Old Rhetoric: an aide memoire’ as well as in Derrida’s occasional 
references to rhetoric10. These are all postmodern writers, or in Nietzsche’s case a 
forerunner of the postmodern, who seem to be involved in some sort of intellectual 
immune response to the pathogenic effect of the Ramist legacy. 
8 See Deely and Peirce below. 
9 Bizzell and Herzberg 2001, Herrick, 2005, Jarratt, 1991, Ong, 1982, Ong, 2004, Perelman, 1982, 
Perelman, 1969, Skinner, 1996. 
10 Nietzsche, 1989, Barthes, 1994, Eagleton, 1981, Derrida, 1991. 
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IDEOSCOPY AND CENOSCOPY  
The Enlightenment denaturing of rhetoric can be argued to be synonymous with 
what Deely following Peirce charts as the rise of ideoscopy and the decline of 
cenoscopy. These terms mean respectively: knowledge originated in special scientific 
ways which it is hard to understand if you are not a relevant specialist like a 
mathematician or somebody equipped with a microscope; as against metaphysically 
originated knowledge worked out by people applying logic in a common-sense 
manner to experience using extant discourse: 
Every department of idioscopy is based upon special observation and only 
resorts to philosophy in order that certain obstacles to its pursuing its special 
observational inquiries may be cleared out of the way… Class II is philosophy, 
which deals with positive truth, indeed, yet contents itself with observations such 
as come within the range of every man’s normal experience, and for the most 
part in every waking hour of his life. Hence Bentham calls this class cœnoscopic. 
These observations escape the untrained eye precisely because they permeate 
our whole lives11.   
Taking up these terms from Bentham and Peirce, Deely writes: 
One way of understanding that historical period or epoch in European history 
called ‘The Enlightenment’ is precisely as that period when ideoscopy began to 
take hold and demand institutionalisation within the framework of the 
developing ‘community of inquirers’ inspired by the idea of the university... The 
exuberance of the early generation of inquirers who turned to ideoscopy, 
especially in the mathematisation of the results of experimentation and 
observation acquired by the systematic use of instruments which extended the 
unaided sense powers of the human body, led to a naive but general expectation 
that ideoscopy, the development of science in the definitively modern sense, 
would ‘slow by slow’ supplant cenoscopy entirely 12.  
This changing of the guard from cenoscopy to ideoscopy and the Ramist dismantling 
of the status of rhetoric is in line with commentaries by modern scholars of rhetoric 
such as James Herrick and Susan Jarratt: 
Vico wrote passionately in response to the great philosopher and mathematician 
Rene Descartes, who despised rhetoric and wished to relegate it to an obscure 
place in the academy… Vico argued that the mathematical proofs of Descartes 
were just as reliant on symbols as were the orations of the rhetoricians… 
Nevertheless the idea that science would provide a rational basis for future 
11 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, New York: Dover Publications, 1955, pp. 66-70. 
12 John Deely, Augustine and Poinsot: The Protosemiotic Development, Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 
2009, p. 4. 
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societies was gaining influence and Vico sought to answer what he viewed as a 
dangerous cultural development13.   
And: 
Though it is impossible to generalise about discourse in all the centuries since 
the sophists, it can be said that the suppression of difference crucial to the 
operation of philosophy has often relegated the heterogeneity of sophistic 
discourse to the margins of the serious public work of knowledge formation and 
communication… This exclusion of sophistic rhetoric might be traced in the 
Christian search for God’s truth or in the medieval emphasis on dialectic over 
“grammar” (i.e. poetics) and rhetoric in the trivium. The most powerful 
operation of this suppression, still operative today, comes with the relegation of 
rhetoric by seventeenth century science to external “color” or supplemental 
“dress” – meaning distorting obfuscation.14  
THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
We will now turn to another critique of Enlightenment rationality which on the face 
of it does not appear to be directly related to rhetoric. But later we will so relate it 
through the concept of morality. Horkheimer and Adorno ‘s The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment  counsels caution about too enthusiastic an embrace of what we currently 
take to be our everyday reality. The authors fled Nazi Germany to the United States 
to write this deep philosophical analysis which was provoked by the horror of that 
period. It is a book about disillusionment with the original promise of scientifically 
enlightened ideas. The book essentially says that since Western culture began, 
organised human-kind, instead of being interested in properly understanding society 
and nature, has always been more intent on controlling and exploiting people and 
nature. The pair’s despair at this folly was obviously accentuated by the terrible ways 
that the Nazis exploited the scientific and social administrative benefits of 
Enlightenment thought. But in a later edition they go on to condemn the post war 
consumer society and if they were alive today surely they would point to the technical 
exploitation and seemingly deliberate misunderstandings of nature which have led to 
the present environmental crisis.  They quote Francis Bacon to argue that: 
For Bacon as for Luther, "knowledge that tendeth but to satisfaction, is but as a 
courtesan, which is for pleasure, and not for fruit or generation." Its concern is 
not "satisfaction, which men call truth," but "operation," the effective 
13 James Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction, Boston: Allyn and Beacon, 2005, p. 176. 
14 Susan Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1991, p. 66. 
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procedure… For enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the 
standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion.15 
But for Horkheimer and Adorno this colonisation or incorporation of more 
effective thinking for self-interested purposes did not start with the last Enlightenment. 
They say the same thing happened in the first enlightenment – the Ancient Greek 
Enlightenment. For them Homeric use of myth was already enlightened. It was 
clearly enlightened because these early sagas already used myth in a way which 
acknowledged myth as myth i.e. as fairy tale. But this enlightened, self-reflective use of 
myth was put to use to depict and surreptitiously accredit a bourgeois political and 
economic system. In other words archaic myth used in an overtly enlightened manner 
was recruited to create a further but unacknowledged, covert myth about the nobility 
of the upper classes. For instance in the story of Odysseus overt, archaic myth is not 
used simply as metaphor or narrative vehicle in order to illustrate the nature and 
geography of the Aegean or the psychology of its inhabitants. Instead it is additionally 
recruited to insinuate social-ideological notions. We are delivered an unacknowledged 
second level myth which is a morality tale about the bourgeoisie. This is a myth which 
helps to create and accredit the noble classes as hero:  
The seafarer Odysseus outwits the natural deities as the civilised traveller was 
later to swindle savages, offering them coloured beads for ivory… Odysseus's 
athletic accomplishments are those of the gentleman who, free of practical cares, 
can train himself in lordly self-mastery … Odysseus inflicts on the stay-at-homes 
symbolically what organized landowning has long since done to them in reality, 
and legitimizes himself as a nobleman.16  
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that from slave owning societies through to scientific 
societies dominant enlightenment thinking, that is rational thinking, has always 
prioritised the maintenance of power over people and over nature. Knowledge for its 
own sake has always come second. They enlist Nietzsche in this argument: 
Like few others since Hegel, Nietzsche recognized the dialectic of 
enlightenment. He formulated the ambivalent relationship of enlightenment to 
power. Enlightenment must be "drummed into the people, so that the priests all 
turn into priests with a bad conscience-and likewise with the state. That is the 
task of enlightenment: to show up the pompous behaviour of princes and 
statesmen as a deliberate lie." However, enlightenment had always been a 
means employed by the "great artists of government (Confucius in China, the 
15 Quoted in Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 from Bacon, Francis, ‘The interpretation of nature’ The 
works of Francis Bacon, 1776, p. 375. 
16 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2002, pp. 39-44. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 213 
Roman Empire, Napoleon, the Papacy, when it was concerned with power and 
not just with the world) ... The self-deception of the masses in this respect -- for 
instance, in all democracies -- is highly advantageous: making people small and 
governable is hailed as 'progress'!"17   
This thesis counsels caution when considering post-Enlightenment reason. 
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest rationality is rife with pragmatic and utilitarian 
assumptions about what the world is, how the world works and how the world should 
work. Sometimes thought is employed ethically; sometimes it is employed in a 
Machiavellian manner. Rarely is thought allowed to range freely for the sake of 
thought as such. It is usually put to a political-technological purpose. It is nearly 
always under the control of some particular motive, some particular power, some 
particular interest. These are motives, powers, and interests which may be blinkered 
in terms of environmental or humane good sense. According to this thesis this is the 
way the world is in the minds of many if not most of us. In further exploring this 
enlightenment pessimism and its implications for rhetoric it is perhaps instructive to 
compare Horkheimer and Adorno’s views to those of their later Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Frankfurt am Main colleague Jürgen Habermas. In 
particular we will look at Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. For those with 
awareness about the history of rhetoric an examination of what Habermas means by 
‘the public sphere’ would seem to open up many possibilities. However, reading 
Habermas’s ‘public sphere’ from the rhetorical perspective throws up a number of 
surprises. 
RATIONALISM VERSUS RHETORIC IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
First a word of explanation: The term ‘public sphere’ is familiar to scholars of 
communication. It was conceived by 1960s translators in an attempt to capture 
German communication theorist Jürgen Habermas’s use of the word ‘offentlichkeit’.18 
In his ‘Translator’s Note’ to Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere,19 Thomas Burger agrees with Kleinsteuber’s translation. Burger writes: 
‘Offentlichkeit…may be rendered variously as ‘‘the public;” “public sphere;” or 
“publicity,”’ The term offentlichkeit/public sphere appears in many of Habermas’s 
17 Ibid., p. 36. 
18 Hans Kleinsteuber, ‘Habermas and the Public Sphere: From a German to European Perspective’, 
Javnost, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001.  
19 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989, p. xv. 
                                                          
 STEVE MACKEY 214 
writings, for instance: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 20, and The Theory of 
Communicative Action.21 Subsequently the term ‘public sphere’ has been widely adopted 
in English. Kleinsteuber suggests offentlichkeit is best understood as ‘openness’ in the 
sense of ‘public-ness’ as opposed to secrecy. In this sense one would expect a 
flourishing democracy to have a healthy ‘public sphere’: That is a political and 
cultural climate conducive to everyone having good access to accurate, candid 
information about social and political factors and decision making. A healthy public 
sphere would also imply that everyone’s opinions about important matters was being 
listened to, respected and that ordinary people were able to participate in important 
decision making in society.  A pathological public sphere would have the opposite 
qualities.   
In the context of a discussion of rhetoric, when considering Habermas and his 
notion of the ‘public sphere’ it is useful to realise that despite the ‘dialectical’ wariness 
of his two above predecessors Habermas is less suspicious of Ramus-affected modern 
rationality: 
Just as in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, the Enlightenment 
critique of myth turned into another myth, so here the principle of the bourgeois 
public sphere, the critical assessment of public policy in rational discussion, 
oriented to a concept of the public interest, turns into what Habermas calls a 
manipulated public sphere in which states and corporations use “publicity” in 
the modern sense of the word to secure for themselves a kind of plebiscitary 
acclamation. Habermas’s analysis however is both more carefully grounded in 
the results of historical, sociological and political scientific research, and 
somewhat less pessimistic in its conclusions.22 
The second part of the above passage implies that for Habermas rational thinking, 
that is post-Enlightenment thinking is not beyond redemption in the way that 
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest it is. For Habermas Enlightenment-informed social 
science can serve the wider public interest. Rationalism is not forever tainted with 
instrumental purposes which bar it from ever really approaching the truth. 
Habermas’s post-Ramus, anti-rhetoric faith in Enlightenment logic is underlined by 
his attack on the alleged post-modern reincarnation of rhetoric in the literary theory 
of Derrida: 
20 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.  
21 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. 
22 William Outhwaite in The Habermas Reader, ed. William Outwaite, Cambridge, Eng: Polity Press, 1996, 
p. 8. 
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If, following Derrida’s recommendation, philosophical thinking were to be 
relieved of the duty of solving problems and shifted over to the problem of 
literary criticism, it would be robbed, not merely of its seriousness, but of its 
productivity… Whoever transposes the radical critique of reason into the 
domain of rhetoric in order to blunt the paradox of self-referentiality, also dulls 
the sword of the critique of reason itself.23  
Passages like the above show that Habermas sees it as too defeatist to argue, as Vico  
might24  that our world outlooks are under the control of the makers of myth, the 
exponents of epideictic, or the silky tongued practitioners of public affairs. Habermas 
is wedded to reasoning and logic in a way which puts him at odds with contemporary 
literary and rhetorical theorists. He argues that society can only be put into contact 
with truth rationally if media workers are allowed professional autonomy. In an article 
about lobbyists; advocates; ‘experts’ (e.g. think tank researchers); moral entrepreneurs 
(good cause campaigners); and intellectuals he suggests: 
There are two types of actors without whom no political public sphere could be 
put to work: professionals of the media system—especially journalists who edit 
news, reports, and commentaries—and politicians who occupy the centre of the 
political system and are both the co-authors and addressees of public opinions. 
Mediated political communication is carried on by an elite. We can distinguish 
five more types among the actors who make their appearance on the virtual 
stage of an established public sphere: (a) lobbyists who represent special interest 
groups; (b) advocates who either represent general interest groups or substitute 
for a lack of representation of marginalized groups that are unable to voice their 
interests effectively; (c) experts who are credited with professional or scientific 
knowledge in some specialized area and are invited to give advice [think tanks]; 
(d) moral entrepreneurs who generate public attention for supposedly neglected 
issues [the Oxfams, the World Visions etc.]; and, last but not least, (e) 
intellectuals who have gained, unlike advocates or moral entrepreneurs, a 
perceived personal reputation in some field (e.g., as writers or academics) who 
engage, unlike experts and lobbyists, spontaneously in public discourse with the 
declared intention of promoting general interests [public intellectuals].25  
 
23 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 
p. 210. 
24 Giambattista  Vico and Leon Pompa, The First New Science, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
25 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an 
Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research, Communication Theory, 
vol. 16, no. 4, 2006, pp. 411-426. 
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For all the authorities quoted in the first sections of this paper the roles (a) to (e) 
are clearly those of rhetoricians. However, Habermas ignores the notion of rhetoric 
and continues on a clearly Post-Enlightenment rationalist track:  
…political communication in the public sphere can facilitate deliberative 
legitimation processes in complex societies only if a self-regulating media system 
gains independence from its social environments and if anonymous audiences 
grant a feedback between an informed elite discourse and a responsive civil 
society.26   
And: 
As an essential element of the democratic process, deliberation is expected to 
fulfil three functions: to mobilize and pool relevant issues and required 
information, and to specify interpretations; to process such contributions 
discursively by means of proper arguments for and against; and to generate 
rationally motivated yes and no attitudes that are expected to determine the 
outcome of procedurally correct decisions.27  
So for Habermas in public affairs, ‘truth’ has to be obtained through: ‘proper 
arguments’ by ‘detached’ ‘anonymous’ people who ‘generate rationally motivated yes 
and no attitudes’. This all sounds a bit like the logical operations of a computer. It is 
to do with detached discourse, discourse which is not tainted by human feelings 
generated from involvement in what is being referred to. Peter Ramus would have 
approved.  
The difference been a rhetorical approach and the view which Habermas takes 
about how the public sphere should operate comes down to this: The rhetorical 
approach suggests that people involved in public affairs, note people involved in, not 
detached from, have a responsibility to constantly orient themselves in terms of the 
morality involved in receiving, developing and passing on rhetoric. People who 
influence thinking, and that means all of us, have to take individual responsibility for 
being human ‘makers of reality’. This is the responsibility which falls like it or not on 
all citizens living in any democracy which claims decent from Athens. As David Held  
writes: 
Athenian democracy was marked by a general commitment to the principle of 
civic virtue: dedication to the republican city state and the subordination of 
private life to public affairs and the common good.28  
26 Ibid., p. 411. 
27 Ibid., p. 416. 
28 David Held, Models of Democracy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 14. 
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But ‘dedication to the republican city state’ then as now requires ethical 
involvement in the political discourse and political decision making of that state and 
consequently involvement in developing and passing on ideas, or in a word: ‘rhetoric’. 
This was the credo of the Periclean Funeral Speech about Athenian democracy as 
crafted by Thucydides (circa 460-395 BCE) who wrote: 
Here [Athens] each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the 
affairs of the state as well…we  do not say that a man who takes no interest in 
politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business 
here at all. We Athenians in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or 
submit them to proper discussion; for we do not think that there is an 
incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action 
before the consequences have been properly debated.29  
Note in the above the acknowledgement of the power of ‘words’ and the need to 
‘debate’ and ‘discuss’ rather than to deduce using some kind of detached pure logic. 
The implication is that all citizens in what is claimed to be a democracy have to 
realise that they have a responsibility to be ethical discussants. Everyone is charged 
with the responsibility of producing culture – that is ideas which lead to social forms – 
in ways which are fair and humane and which steer away from nihilistic tendencies. 
Habermas by contrast argues for the professional class to be organised rationally. 
Society should be engineered such that, for instance, communication professionals are 
made autonomous, that is not beholden to any special interests. This autonomy would 
somehow produce upright professionals who Rousseau-like, or Kant-like would then 
clearly know what is the right thing to do by some transcendental realisation. But if 
we compare this Habermassian view to that of Horkheimer and Adorno we can see 
that the latter might deny this optimism. Horkheimer and Adorno hold that 
knowledge always has a tendency to be initiated by passions for self-interest. 
Consequently, however liberated and independent, how can we guarantee that 
professional communicators will not indulge in the self-interest warned about by the 
two Frankfurt School pessimists? It is as if Habermas believes that freedom somehow 
leads automatically to pure minds and a sort of pure rationality which in turn will 
bring about pure understanding. The position of this paper by contrast is that what is 
needed is the millennia-old notion of ethically policed rhetoric. In the absence of 
ethically policed rhetoric Habermas offers the concept of ‘deliberative legitimation’. 
That is he prioritises external rules on discourse rather than dealing with the internal 
morality of the discussants. He prefers to advocate an external quasi-judicial 
institution rather than an internal mental-moral-conscience centred institution. This 
29  Cited from The History of the Peloponnesian War, Ibid., p. 14. 
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hygienic sidelining of the ‘personal-ethical’ indicates a rejection of the organic-
rhetorical approach to democratic discourse in favour of an artificial scientism of this 
difficult area. A central weakness in Habermas’s argument is that whatever the 
mechanism of ‘deliberative legitimation’ there actually needs to be really informed 
and ethical professionals in the categories (a) to (e) above who will act properly in 
order to take advantage of the special immunities and authorisations that are 
bestowed upon them. If there are not Habermas’s schema fails. In other words 
Habermas’s schema provides the external conditions for autonomous professionals. 
But it relies on finding recruits who are suitably educated, sufficiently honest and who 
possess sage wisdom. This means either the new social structure will cause such 
paragons to magically appear, or a hunt would need to be launched. The recruitment 
effort will be to find people with suitable, internalised intellectual and moral qualities. 
Without such erudite and ethical people, the above discussed ‘deliberative 
legitimation’ or ‘elite discourse’ become empty ideas. So in other words Habermas 
focuses on the structure and form of an imaginary political environment which might 
produce an egalitarian public sphere of discourse. Rhetoric on the other hand is more 
concerned with the moral quality of communicators themselves – i.e. all of us. In 
contrast to this approach to reasoning rhetoric emphasises the need for the types of 
people who we are internally. It is individual internal morality which determines the 
quality of a democracy and its public sphere. Abstract social forms dreamed up via 
some putative rational process have less efficacy in this respect.   
RHETORIC AND ETHICS VERSUS RATIONALITY AND ETHICS 
Alasdair MacIntyre has a rather critical view of the way many putatively rational 
thinkers approach ethics:  
The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it 
is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in 
which those disagreements are expressed is their interminable character… 
There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture.30   
This is written in the third edition of MacIntyre’s After Virtue which is famous for 
giving up on much Enlightenment philosophy of ethics and instead, almost in 
exasperation, reaching back to Aristotelian principles of civic virtue. Ethics is a big 
subject in philosophy where it is reasoned about under such rationalist notions as 
deontology, consequentialism, utilitarianism and teleology. But surely in practical 
terms ultimately some person-in-the-street notion of ethicality has to be resorted to? 
30 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2007, p. 6. 
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Practical democracy after all is the province and the responsibility of people in 
general who all live their lives and make every-day decisions far removed from the 
realm of philosophers. A turn to a proper understanding of the notion of rhetoric can 
help with this conundrum. This is because the issue of ethics has always been 
inseparable from rhetoric and vice-versa.  
Unlike today, dialectic, grammar and rhetoric used to be all of a piece with 
morality. The moral nature of rhetoric is particularly underlined by St Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430) who was a professor of rhetoric as well as a main pillar of Western 
Christianity 31. The example of Augustine underlines the point that for many centuries 
truth as perceive by the church was sacred. I.e. the ‘Word’ was tied to particular 
ethical conventions. But the inseparability of rhetoric from moral practice goes back 
much further than that. Two and a half millennia ago Isocrates (BCE 436–338) a 
famed rhetorician contemporary of Plato wrote: 
…there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not 
helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things 
just and unjust and things base and honourable; and if it were not for these 
ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that 
we confute the bad and extol the good.32    
Isocrates’ wisdom is reflected down the centuries in the words of other famous 
rhetoricians such as Cicero (BCE 106–43) and Quintilian (ca. 35–96). Cicero’s 
argument for the necessity of morality in public affairs is implicit and often explicit 
throughout his writing, for instance in On Duties III:   
…for one man to take something from another and to increase his own 
advantage at the cost of another’s disadvantage is more contrary to nature than 
death, than poverty, than pain and than anything else that may happen to his 
body or external possessions. In the first place it destroys the common life and 
the fellowship of men: … the thing that is most of all in accordance with nature 
will be shattered, that is the fellowship of the human race.33   
The link between sound morals and oratory – a major vehicle of rhetoric is 
remarked by Quintilian:  
…he who would answer my idea of an orator must be a good man…no man, 
unless he be good, can ever be an orator… It is of importance that an orator 
31 Augustine, The Confessions; The City of God; On Christian Doctrine, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1952.    
32 Isocrates, trans. George Norlin and Larue Van Hook, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1928, p. 6-7. 
33 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, trans. Miriam Griffin and E. M. Atkins, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 108. 
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should be good because, should the power of speaking be to support an evil, 
nothing would be more pernicious than eloquence alike to public concerns and 
private, and I myself, who as far as it is in my power, strive to contribute 
something to the faculty of the orator, should deserve very ill of the world, since 
I would furnish arms not for soldiers, but for robbers.34   
Aristotle, another scholar of rhetoric, also wrote the Nicomachean Ethics. And as we have 
seen he codified rhetoric as requiring the elements of ethos, logos and pathos - 
character, logic and emotion. In other words we are not persuaded by people if they 
have poor character even if they speak with the utmost rationality and instil deep 
emotion in us. Morality is intrinsic to how communication helps us to form our 
thought.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued for the restoration of the prestige and understanding of the 
millennia-old art of rhetoric. It has explained its dismantling by Enlightenment ideas 
and the critique and contradictions which this eclipse has led to. This is all that this 
paper has had the space to explain. What needs to be started in another paper is a 
mapping of the intellectual travesty and political-social disaster which has resulted. 
Nobody wants to re-kindle the morality of the slave-owning society of the Ancient 
Greeks or the ridiculous waffle of the religious. But that is not the point. What insight 
into the long existence of the post-Enlightenment decline of rhetoric gives us is a hint 
about rhetoric’s importance. This is a hint about how dangerous has been the 
decoupling of persuasive discourse and moral schema from dialectic. Discourse: the 
codes by which people think – is all that differentiates civilisation from animal 
existence. The ideas in people’s heads are what humanity is. But it is a massive 
mistake to attribute the ideas in people’s heads to logical processes alone. As the 
ancients knew, but apparently the moderns do not, thinking is a product of dialectic 
and its counterpart: rhetoric. Persuasive communication is as fundamental to 
civilisation as is logic. But clearly if that is the case, civilisation can be stamped out if 
persuasive communication is not under the control of, or guided by, suitable morality. 
One does not have to make an argument here for draconian censorship and control of 
the media. But one does have to say that every utterance everywhere in every media; 
media ranging from the global commercial to neighbourhood gossip, has to be taken 
34 Quintilian, ‘Institutes of Oratory’, trans. R. J. S. Watson, in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg eds., 
The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, Boston: Bedford St Martin's, 2001, p. 413.  
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far more seriously than it presently is. The above rhetorical roles (a) to (e) ironically 
not named as such by Habermas need to be far better understood and taken far more 
seriously. There needs to be far more transparency about the individuals who play 
these roles, particularly if their interventions are especially powerful. These people’s 
qualifications need to be far more transparent in terms of their morality, their 
education, their financial and other personal interests, their benevolent or evil track 
record. In the distant past many of the most important rhetoricians were ordained as 
priests. Others were celebrated as leading statesmen and outstanding humanists. In 
those eras the identity, character and status of the far fewer people who significantly 
shaped thought were clear. By contrast today thought is perhaps most powerfully 
influenced by matrices of maybe hundreds of thousands of unknown men and women 
who live unremarkable, invisible lives as communication workers of one sort or 
another. They work in the quasi professions listed near the start of this paper: 
‘specialists in: psychology…event management and so on’. These knowledge workers, 
albeit unconsciously, subscribe to a post-Enlightenment ideology which marginalises 
the status of their work. They are not helped in this sleepwalking by a deficient 
‘rationalist’ academia which is ill-equipped to challenge their lack of awareness. 
Neither the practitioners nor the more culpable academics sufficiently recognise the 
civilisation-affecting consequences of the persuasive communication work being 
carried out. This ‘professional’ work is ‘accredited’ by ethical codes aligned to the 
pathological assumptions of Ramus and to varieties of the subsequent post- 
Enlightenment rationalist strains of thought. Like an iceberg, only one fifth of the 
products of this knowledge industry is visible. It is most visible in the cultural 
outcomes manifest in celebrity showbiz including celebrity academia and the woefully 
unintelligent popular politics, popular economics and other aspects of popular culture 
which we all have to suffer. It is time that intellectuals woke up to this industrial scale 
amoralising of contemporary putatively ‘civilised’ thought. The slumber which needs to 
be shaken off is not the slumber of somebody who has not caught a better idea 
emerging from the Enlightenment. It is the slumber of, the forgetting of, what 
happened to thought during the Enlightenment, or for Horkheimer and Adorno – of 
what happens to thought in any enlightenment.  
Clearly, with modern technology there are now billions of people capable of 
becoming right thinking rhetoricians in comparison to the few thousands who filled 
this niche in centuries past. However in centuries past only a few thousands went to 
universities or their equivalent. Today hundreds of millions go to universities. The 
forgotten central role of these universities is explained in this paper. It is the central 
role of questioning thinking in a way which can evolve the capacity to understand. 
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Rhetoricians understand how people understand and they use that knowledge to 
orient other’s understandings for the better or for the worse. Consequently we should 
join with Hobbes who urges us to understand rhetoric so that we reduce the ways it 
can be used for evil.   
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